In 1957, the post-Suez Defence Review ruled that nuclear weapons would provide the basis for British security. This decision effectively reinforced the need for close US relations. This “special relationship” with America that had first developed during the Second World War lasts to today, with Britain now regarded as an important “junior” partner in the War on Terrorism. Furthermore, the thinking expressed in that 1950s document underpins our present-day nuclear policy, a policy that is to be discussed this afternoon in Parliament.
Today, MPs vote on whether to renew Trident, Britain’s sole remaining independent nuclear deterrent. Of the four practical options considered, the Government has chosen a submarine-based system similar to the present one, equipped with the Trident D5 missile (pictured above). The Conservative Opposition is supporting the government, thereby assuring that the legislation is passed. Without Conservative support, the likely Labour back-bench rebellion would have stopped the decision being made to replace Britain’s nuclear weaponry.
The government of this country has many responsibilities, none though, are more important than the defence of the realm. It is for this reason that if I was an MP I would be casting my vote in favour of replacing our nuclear deterrent. In doing so, however, I would have a nagging doubt in my mind that an opportunity to forge a new path in British foreign policy had been missed. That opportunity may very well not come around for another few decades.
The case for Britain having an independent nuclear deterrent was once dependent upon the existence of an obvious foe, the Soviet Union. The size of the Soviet nuclear arsenal was so immense that it was a widely held belief that, for NATO to have an effective deterrent, more than one of its members was required to bear nuclear weapons. This foe no longer exists, having been replaced by a Russian government less likely to instigate nuclear Armageddon. Not only do we no longer have a country as an aggressor, it is questionable that a future nuclear foe would be a defined state. What of the awful image of a suicide bomber equipped with a nuclear device attacking the London Underground? Against whom would we retaliate? A token Muslim city? So, why should we retain these weapons? Do they augment our political status?
It has been argued that Britain needs to possess nuclear weapons to justify its privileged position as a permanent member of the UN Security Council. I don’t like this argument. It implies diplomatic strength and political status solely go ‘hand-in-hand’ with military strength. Are we suggesting that Pakistan, Israel, North Korea, and possibly Iran, should be granted permanent membership? And if not, what message does that send? Develop WMD and spread the technology and then we will take you seriously? My point is that political status is not, and should not be, necessarily dependent upon nuclear capability. Both Germany and Japan wield diplomatic power without possessing nuclear weapons. Maybe if Britain was no longer seen as America’s unquestioning partner, its political status in the eyes of others would rise?
The problem though, is that any decision to give up Britain’s nuclear weapons would practically be irrevocable. The technology, and more importantly, the people with the requisite knowledge, could not respond in time to a change in the international security situation. History painfully teaches us that within the twenty years required to develop a replacement nuclear weapon system, world events could lead to dramatic changes in global threats. I believe, therefore, that the sensible and prudent decision is to retain a modest nuclear deterrent capability. To give up nuclear weapons just when other countries are acquiring them would rightly be seen by the British public as irresponsible. I just wish, however, we could have taken time to fashion a new foreign policy that was not written in the 1950s. The world has since changed. Our foreign policy has not.
